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work them through. The book does not contain the texts of the various acts
or regulations which are necessary concomitants to this volume. The authors
assume that separate copies of those acts and regulations will be available for
use with the book. It would have been very helpful had it been possible to
reproduce these in an appendix so that they could be readily available instead
of requiring the use of separate pamphlets. The material on state blue-sky
regulations and on the definition of what is a "security" is overweighted and
somewhat distorted by the disproportionate inclusion of California material.
It might also have been well to shorten a number of the cases by summarizing
their facts.
Despite these few observations of a minor and gently critical nature, this
book is a very welcome and excellent "coursebook" which recognizes a long
felt need and fills it very well.
STANLEY A. KAPLAN*
* Professor of Law, The University of Chicago
Criminal Law: Problems for Decision in the Promulgation, Invocation, and
Administration of a Law of Crimes. By RicHARD C. DONNELLY, JOSEPH
GOLDSTEIN, and RbcIARD D. ScHwARTZ. New York: The Free Press of
Glencoe, 1962. Pp. xxvi, 1169. $15.00.
The merits of the traditional case-book approaches to teaching law have
given rise to debates too numerous to recount. But Criminal Law constitutes
so vigorous a dissent from the traditional heavy reliance upon printed deci-
sions that it may be worth recalling two of the criticisms toward which its
authors appear particularly responsive.
First, there is the complaint that the experience which has been the life
of the law has all too often been the experience of lawyers alone, and that
case-books have failed to keep students abreast of the teachings of non-legal
fields. No doubt, the "law" that a student can read in the decision of an anti-
trust case may have drawn heavily upon the literature of "economics." A hard
case in the law of equitable nuisance may have forced a court to investigate
the state of industrial technology, and thus to have made good law., But even
in those areas in which decision law has absorbed the logic of other learnings,
students dieted wholly upon printed cases are better trained to keep up with
the pace of the courts than to assume a lead.
Further, issues actually litigated and appealed may be somewhat narrower
in scope than those with which a lawyer or legislator does or might concern
himself. Thus, for example, a prisoner's civil rights action against a guard may
convey a glimmer of what can happen in a prison; but as a picture of the
total post-conviction concern of the criminal process, any series of conceivable
1 See L. Martin Co. v. L. Martin & Wilckes Co., 75 N.J. Eq. 39, 71 Ati. 409 (1908):
Fletcher v. Bealey, L.R. 28 Ch. 688 (1885).
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law suits will be woefully one-sided and inadequate. Similarly, for every
Bonanno 2 or Colonel Abel3 whose search and arrest grievances find their way
into print, one suspects a thousand arrests whose victims are not even taken
to jail with an eye towards ultimate prosecution, much less bound over to the
courts: suspected homosexuals and gamblers arrested for the sanction of
arrest itself; suspected prostitutes rounded up at night in order to be given a
medical examination in the morning; suspected drunks locked away so that
they will not stumble under a trolley.4 As a result, no matter how conscien-
tiously a case-book author may have screened his field, there will remain at
least a penumbra of quasi-legal activity that a traditional case-book can do
little to illuminate, and that may rightly merit a law student's consideration.
The authors of Criminal Law have, indeed, seen fit to reprint goodly por-
tions of over two hundred cases. But the entire book spans about 1,200
extra-large pages, and the balance of materials has been drawn from sources
ranging from V. I. Lenin and Thurman Arnold to A. Jones (inmate, Connecti-
cut State Prison) and Donald Webster Cory (pseudonym for a homosexual).
For philosophical guidance CriminalLaw looks to Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel
Kant, C. S. Lewis and Percy Bridgman; for spiritual insight, to the Church
of England Moral Welfare Council, Pope Pius XII, the British Catholic Ad-
visory Committee on Prostitution and Homosexual Offences and a professor
of moral theology, West Baden College, West Baden, Indiana. The Chairman
of the Board of the General Electric Corporation is on hand to explain how
decentralization will assure responsible and profitable management. A profes-
sional thief lends his memoirs to illustrate the "shakedown" and the "muzzle."
It is, however, with the views of sociologists, psychiatrists and psychologists
that Criminal Law has been particularly indulgent. Bernard Glueck, Henry
Beacher, Margaret Mead, Alfred Kinsey, Karl Menninger, Talcott Parsons,
Sigmund Freud, Albert Ellis, Karl M. Bowman, Pitirim Sorokin, Hermann
Mannheim-these are just a few whose writings one finds interlaced with the
more traditional text-book teachings of Justices Holmes, Cardozo and Frank-
furter.
Criminal Law is divided into three chapters, each of which the authors
maintain to be "an entity which permits a total view of the criminal process,
though from different vantage points."5 Chapter I is "The Case of Dr. Martin:
2 United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. Bufalino v.
United States, 285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).
3 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960) (upholding the conviction of the accused
Russian agent who was subsequently exchanged for U-2 pilot Francis G. Powers).
4 See LaFave, The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody pt. IV (1962) (unpublished
monograph prepared for the American Bar Foundation); J. Goldstein, Police Discretion
Not To Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960); N.Y. Times, June 16, 1957, p. 67, col. 1, reprinted in GoLDsrEN,
DoNNEmLY & SciwA.Tz, Cpm&NAL LAw 547 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CmuL LAw].
5 Preface to CRnmi.AL LAw at v.
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An Introductory View of the Criminal Process"; Chapter II, "Promulgating
a Criminal, Penal, Correctional or'?' Code"; Chapter III, "A Re-examination
of the Criminal Law in Terms of Groups."
The first chapter is the most strikingly indicative of the new approach.
Although some 250 pages in length, it never loses sight of a single "case." 6
The focus of concern is one "Dr. Martin," a pseudonym for a man who
was a highly eminent and respected pediatrician. (Among his many laurels,
at one time he ran both the Pediatrics Department of the University of Chicago
Medical School and its Bobs Roberts Memorial Hospital for Children.) One
summer he decided to settle in a cabin in a small town in Connecticut to
practice an "experimental and unorthodox approach" to the treatment of
disturbed children. As explained by defense counsel:
The approach was to induce the child to go back in his life to the age when
his trouble started, and then to guide him anew up to his present age along
lines which would be more comforting to him and more acceptable to others
-regression, and then progression or re-education.7
In the eyes of the state's attorney, who was prepared to concede both the
doctor's eminence and his unorthodoxy, his treatment looked a good deal
like what the State of Connecticut deems sodomy. And if the "cure" had
proved successful in preventing a ten year old boy from barking like a dog,
the prosecution evidenced a layman's bewilderment as to why the lad's normal
and non-barking brothers, nine and thirteen, had to be summoned to the
cabin and treated with equal fervor. 8 The defense: It was "calculated to show
the structure of the [family] relationship." 9 And so the debate begins.
The authors proceed to pursue this "case" with a thoroughness that is in
many respects highly rewarding. Two separate lines of inquiry appear. First,
Dr. Martin's involvement with the law becomes the occasion for a broad
survey of the administration of the criminal process. Second, the charges that
are levied against the Doctor allow for an unusually far-ranging examination
of the concepts of "guilt" and "innocence."
From the first standpoint, in the Martin case, as often throughout the book,
Criminal Law takes pains to point up the full breadth of legal activity-even
to the point of acquainting the student with the minutiae of a lawyer's craft
which other texts ignore. Dr. Martin's confrontation with the criminal law
is, examined from Connecticut's first legislative decision to define the crime
(the sodomy statute of 1642) until Dr. Martin's release from parole (September
1960). In the interval, the book has afforded the student an opportunity to
consider the chance conversation that led to the invocation of the criminal
process; to examine the present statutes; to inspect a criminal information;
and to debate the criteria by which he might decide whether to plead his client
6 The case is unreported. 8 See id. at 26.
7 CRUAINAL LAw 17. 9 Id. at 20.
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nolo contendere (as Dr. Martin's counsel pleaded him). The courtroom scenes
(at the pre-sentence hearing) continue the survey of the legal process. Here
is how the state's attorney presents "the facts"; here, the way in which they
are molded by the attorney for Dr. Martin. Through the judge's colloquy with
counsel, and through his fairly spontaneous remarks at the sentencing session,
the judicial portrait emerges honestly, without the self-consciousness that
necessarily infects an oft-drafted opinion.
Rather than abandon their subject at the sentencing, the authors proceed
to examine the functions of the Sentence Review Board. Should the members
inquire into Dr. Martin's remorsefulness, the extent of harm to his victims,
the extent of harm to the community? A section based on the Connecticut
Security Treatment Act follows: "Should Care and Treatment in a Mental
Institution Be an Alternative Sanction to Sentence or Probation ?" Thereafter,
the authors return more directly to Dr. Martin by parading out his file as it first
came before the eyes of the Parole Board. What statutes govern the Parole
Board's operation? What considerations ought to guide their decisions-as
distinguished from the decision of the prosecutor? of the judge? of the Sen-
tence Review Board? Can the social sciences come to the law's aid with
"prediction tables"? To cast light upon the operation of the Parole Board,
the authors reprint an actual parole hearing. Then: should Martin have ap-
plied for a pardon? The book sets out Governor Stratton's reasoning in his
pardon of Nathan F. Leopold, Jr.
From this "procedural" standpoint, the net impact of the Martin case is
to have presented the administration of the criminal law in full perspective-
both as to time, and as to actors; to have shed light upon the nature and
"cause" of the community's reaction; and to have alerted concern for al-
ternative theories of sanction and/or treatment. It is well worth noting that
in the process, by representing the accused as a human being caught up in
the machinery of the criminal process (and not as a cause of action, merely)
the book may do its part to heighten the interest of students in proceeding
to the criminal bar.
In handling the second inquiry-the issue of "guilt" or "innocence"-the
authors have avoided the case-book pitfall of presenting only the criteria that
the present state of the Law has sanctified as relevant and of seeking guidance
only in the sources It has stamped with approval.
One of the statutes under which Dr. Martin was accused makes it a crime
to "do any act likely to impair the health or morals of any.., child" under
sixteen. How likely was Dr. Martin to have impaired the health of any of his
wards? The prosecutor told the judge he had "no doubt.., as to the effect
of the homosexual acts upon the boy." Enter Donnelly, Goldstein and
Schwartz with an excerpt from the American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, "A
Follow-up Report on Children who had Atypical Sexual Experiences." Should
one seek to determine how likely was Dr. Martin's treatment to improve their
1963]
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health and to advance science? Or would such an investigation be foreclosed
by the logic of the doctor's trial at Nuremburg? Or should the law regard
these cases differently? Why? How about cancer research experiments on pris-
oners-are wardens entitled to arrogate to themselves authority denied Dr.
Martin? Is this because cancer is worse than barking like a dog? Or because the
inmates are "of age" and sign "release" blanks? Or because whereas wardens
are paid by the state, Dr. Martin received sexual gratification?
The statute spoke of injuring "morals." How do we know what is "mor-
als"? The authors set out an opinion and a dissent upon this point by Judges
Learned Hand and Jerome Frank. Excerpts follow from a debate and corre-
spondence upon the subject of "Ascertaining the Moral Sense of the Com-
munity"10 and "The Art of Opinion Research: A Lawyer's Appraisal of an
Emerging Science.""1 Criminal Law reprints letters sent to the editor of the
local newspaper after the various versions of the Martin case "facts" have been
aired: "there is no doubt in my mind as to the soundness and honesty of Dr.
Martin as an individual as well as a professional...."; "everyone who ever
had the privilege of knowing him will stand up for his integrity and sincerity
of purpose...."; "vile... sex perversion ....'. The focus on Dr. Martin
then fades out and a legislative hearing is in session. Here the authors have
gathered together fifty pages of materials which may or may not be relevant
to enactment upon (or refusal to enact upon) the problem of consensual
homosexual acts between adult males in private. The thirty-seven "witnesses"
range from the Most Reverend William Godfrey, Archbishop of Westminister,
England, to Fowler V. Harper. These materials have been utilized, both at
Chicago and at Yale, as the basis for mock legislative hearings, the various
members of the first year classes having been given different points of view
to propound, assigned roles as inquisitive "legislators," or appointed "coun-
sel" to represent the divers "witnesses" who appear.
Chapter II, "Promulgating a Criminal, Penal, Correctional or '?' Code"
progresses by gathering materials under a series of basic questions: "What
are the Differences Between Civil and Criminal Law?" The authors begin
with an excerpt from Samuel Butler's Erewhon, in which a judge is sentencing
the accused for "the great crime of laboring under pulmonary consumption"
("you are a bad and dangerous person"), and follow it up with Moore v.
Draper,12 a 1952 Florida case in which a habeas corpus petitioner, challenging
the constitutionality of a statute under which he was committed to a tubercu-
losis sanitarium, is told, "tuberculosis was recognized as one of the most
dreadful diseases and one of the greatest killers.... [T]hose afflicted with the
disease were a menace to society."' 13
10 CwrNMAL LAW 126-31 (Professors J. Cohen, R.A.H. Robson, A. Bates and Judges
L. Hand, J. Parker).
11 Id. at 132-36 (Professors W. Blum, H. Kalven).
12 57 So. 2d 648 (Fla. 1952). 13Id. at 648.
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"Is a Law of Crimes Dispensable?" Lenin says, under communism, "yes"
Bertrand Russell says, under anarchy, "mostly."14
"What are the Purposes of Sanctions in the Criminal Process " The authors
produce a 1595 Dutch case in which the accused, a dog who has fatally
bitten a little boy in an effort to snap away a piece of meat, is condemned to
be "hanged by the executioner upon the gallows with a rope until death
ensues, that further his dead body be dragged on a hurdle to the gallows-field,
and that he there remain hanging... to the deterring of other dogs and to
all as an example."' 5
"What are the Requisites of a Crime ?" The American Law Institute cleaves
the principles of liability into (1) "act"--"a bodily movement"; (2) "omis-
sion"--"a failure to act"; and (3) "possession."16 Is it a "bodily movement...
voluntary or involuntary" to have one's "head out of the [car] window leering
at [the prosecutrix] a curious look" 217 Upon which theory does California
punish one who "roams about from place to place without any lawful busi-
ness" ?18 "Act", "Omission" ? Or something else: an "act of status"? Upon
which theory does the New York police department justify its periodic arrest
extravaganzas, in which "the courts [turn] those arrested back into the streets
almost as fast as they [are] picked up" ?19
"What Provoking Events Mitigate or Negate What Crimes ?" An American
soldier, released, brainwashed, from a P.O.W. Camp in Korea, is alternately
"tried" for collaboration by the United States Court of Military Appeals2O
and by a psychiatrist.21
Inevitably, with such a collage of wisdom as the authors of Criminal Law
have pasted together, the book will make baffling headway for a reader nur-
tured on more conventional undertakings, geared to demonstrate the harmony
that lies at the end of the path of Reason. The challenge is not so much that
the materials gathered together so often compete and contradict. It is rather
that, so often, counterpoised sections have never, until now, given one another
the slightest thought; and finding themselves wanting in a common tongue
for debate, they are left to stare back and forth in uneasy, bewildered silence.
The overall structure has been thoughtfully conceived. But the very conception
14 See CRPMNAL LAW 300-02 (selections from LENIN, IMPENRASM-THE STATE AND
REVOLUTION 193 (1929) and RuSSELL, ROADs TO FREEDOM 130-36 (1918)).
15The Case of Provetie (1595), reprinted in 24 S.A.L.J. 232-34 (1907); CRIMNAL LAW
309.
16 MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.14(2), (4), 2.01(1), (4) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
17 State v. Ingram, 237 N.C. 197, 74 S.E.2d 532 (1953).
18 CAL. PEN. CODE § 647 (3).
19 See N.Y. Times, supra note 7.
20 United States v. Fleming, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 543, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957).
21 Schein, The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War, 19 PSYCHIATRY 149
(1956), selections reprinted in CRIMrNAL LAW 708-17.
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is a labyrinth of a thought, cautious enough to turn and to withdraw and
to reexamine its handiwork, but thus wrought with dead ends, too, and
often difficult to follow. Criminal Law is not what a first year student will
consider an "easy" text, with a fast moving sequence of questions raised
and answers given.
The book's treatment of Regina v. Machekequonabe22 may serve as an
example. The defendant was a pagan Indian whose tribe believed in evil spirits
in human form, called Wendigos, or Windigos, who ate human flesh. Rumor
having it that a Windigo was dallying about their camp, the defendant and
others were posted as sentries. Espying what he took to be a Windigo, and
receiving no answer to his repeated challenges, defendant fired upon what
turned out to be, on more conscientious inspection, his foster father. The trial
judge directed a verdict of guilty of manslaughter should the jury find (as it
did) that the prisoner was "sane apart from the delusion or belief in the
existence of a Wendigo." Michael and Wechsler bring up this unfortunate
episode twice, once under "The Problem of Criminal Negligence" and once
under "Mistake of Fact." 23
Donnelly, Goldstein and Schwartz, who treat of Machekequonabe's fate
under the broader heading "What Provoking Events Negate or Mitigate What
Crimes," are not satisfied with the court's decision as a basis for classroom
discussion. They add to the Michael and Wechsler account the defense's
argument ("There was no intention even to harm a human being, much less
to kill. At common law the following of a religious belief would be an excuse.")
and then pick up an excerpt from a paper on "Windigo Psychosis" delivered
to the American Ethnological Society.24 Its author points out (1) that ten of
thirty-three windigos whom the tribe "treated" for their cannibalistic urge
"recovered" in the people's eyes; (2) the tribe did not believe in retribution,
but killed for purposes of prevention; an especially critical consideration since
(3) they believed that one act of cannabalism led to another. This information
is followed by a lengthier paper discussing "Cultural Factors in the Structurali-
zation of Perception." 25 Its author examines in detail one Adam Big Mouth's
run-in with a Windigo, concluding that while "perception in man may be said
to have acquired an overlaid social function," any given perception has, at its
core, an element of the individual:
Part of the psychological interest of Adam Big Mouth's experience with
a windigo lies in the fact that he himself was responsible for the perceptual
22 28 Ont. 309 (1897).
2 3 MICHAEL & WECHSLER, CRIMNAL LAw AND rrs ADMINISTRATION (1940). The case is
set out at 101-02, and referred to be read again at 772.
24 Teicher, Windigo Psychosis, 1960 PROCEEDiNGS OF THE AMERiCAN ETHNOLOGICAL So-
cIETY 108, set out in part in CRuINAL LAw 679.
25 Hallowell, Cultural Factors in the Structuralization ofPerception in Soc:L PSYCHOLOGY
AT THE CRossRoADs (Rohrer & Sherif eds. 1951), in CIMNAL LAw 679.
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structuralization of this particular situation. Another Indian in the same
objective situation and belonging to the same cultural group may, or may
not, have perceived a windigo. Consequently, it is inaccurate and mislead-
ing, I believe, to speak of cultural determinism in such a 6ase.26
Much of such material does, of course, anticipate possible lines of student
reaction and can lay a foundation for some lively classroom rhetoric. But
at times one suspects that, from the authors' fear of leaving out anything
that might contain the merest germ of a useful idea, they were willing to
risk many inclusions of tenuous relevance. A reader's ability to skim with
a discerning eye will prove a virtue.
At least two sections of the book ought to be singled out for their general
excellence. One is the section on provoking events, negating or mitigating,
already mentioned. Beginning with a Justice Cardozo opinion on the "law
of retreat," 27 it advances through a wealth of generally fine material without
much further concern for the traditional legal pigeonholes; and the reading
is no less thought provoking for the sacrifice.
The following section-"Under What Circumstances and to What Extent
are Health (Mental and Physical) and Age (Chronological and Psychological)
of the Defendant Relevant to his Criminal Liability ?"-is easily the most
complete and thoughtful treatment of its subject matter to be found in any
law school text. It is typical of so much of the authors' handling of material
that after reprinting the appellate decision in Durham v. United States,28
Messrs. Donnelly, Goldstein and Schwartz pursue the affair to the retrial that
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered. They ask: What difference
does Durham make in practical effect? And if the answer is just a wee bit
comical, it is not without its virtue for alerting students to the chasm that may
separate appellate court theory from trial court practice-and doctors from
lawyers.
Undoubtedly, when considered as a guide-book to prepare law students for
their roles as winning attorneys, the merits of assembling such a text will be
debated. Some will quip that a well-rounded young lawyer, made acquainted
with Sigmund Freud's Thoughts on War and Death, may win clients with an
added dimension to his repartee, but probably not cases. If there is truth in
this jest, it ought not to be overlooked that "the law" has found its way into
Criminal Law, both through the wide selection of cases, and through the
wealth of non-case-law legal materials with which the book abounds: oral
argument before the Supreme Court, examination and cross-examination of
expert witnesses, grand jury reports, argument on prayer for instruction,
opening and closing statements to juries, the entering of pleas, appearance of
26 Id. at 681. (Emphasis in original.)
27 People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496 (1914).
28 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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counsel before Congress, psychiatric evaluations of prisoners, probation re-
ports, a request for removal of detainer, a charge to a jury, a congressional
report, an appellate brief, pardons, the entering of sentences, arguments before
the Nuremberg Tribunal, parole hearings, the appointment of a lunacy com-
mission, and a great deal more. From this standpoint, the problem (if it is
one) is merely that Criminal Law is an unusually large book, and although
the strictly legal29 materials do not lack, traditionalists will consider them
spread out and watered down. CriminalLaw has so many resources, however,
that no instructor will be able to teach from it without some picking and choos-
ing; and a teacher who is so inclined could pick and choose so as to conduct
a class that is just about as traditionally "law" oriented as anyone would like.
On the other hand, Criminal Law was not conceived to lend students "such
a mastery [of doctrines] as to be able to apply them with constant... cer-
tainty."3 0 Insofar as the book has "doctrine," it is to disturb doctrine and to
mock certainty. Criminal Law must be something like what Walter Cook
imagined, a quarter of a century ago, when he proposed the establishment of
a school whose "primary purpose would be the non-professional study of law,
in order that the function of law may be more clearly understood, its limita-
tions appreciated, its results evaluated, and its future development kept more
nearly in touch with the complexities of modem life."31 The usefulness of
CriminalLaw need not await the creation of such a school, however. Utilizing
any criminal law class as the setting for unconfined inquiry, the book may
succeed in lending to the students' approach to the entire range of the law
both a skepticism and a constructiveness that would be well worth the added
effort.
CHRISTOPHER D. STONE*
2 9 But see Introduction to CuMINAL LAW at 4: "In preparing these materials we have
sought to avoid categorizing them either as legal or non-legal. They have been selected to
help law students become lawyers, not to become professionals in other disciplines."
30 Preface to the first edition of LANGDELL, CASEs ON CONTRACTs at viii (2d ed. 1879).
31 Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303, 309 (1927). Professor Cook
meant "non-professional" in the sense that "the aim of the school would not be the produc-
tion of practioners but the development of the scientific study of law," although "with-
out doubt, some of the graduates of the school would go into practice, and perhaps be-
come leaders of the bar, judges, members of the legislature, or members of administrative
commissions or other public bodies." Ibid. As indicated, note 28 supra, Professors Donnelly,
Goldstein and Schwartz regard the primary aim of their materials as "to help law students
become lawyers, not to become professionals in other disciplines."
* Law and Economics Fellow, The University of Chicago.
